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Abstract
The problem of maximizing secrecy rate of multiple-input multiple-output multiple-eavesdropper
(MIMOME) channels with arbitrary numbers of antennas at each node is studied in this paper. It is
proved that linear beamforming is optimum for this problem and optimal signaling to achieve the secrecy
capacity is then developed. To this end, it is shown that optimal precoding is a rotation matrix resulted
from a set of basic rotations each with one parameter. Next, a gradient-descent based algorithm is
developed to find the rotation and power allocation parameters. The proposed rotation-based method
can be applied to any MIMOME channels and outperforms state-of-the-art analytical and numerical
methods. In particular, the rotation-based precoding achieves higher secrecy rates than the celebrated
generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD)-based precoding, with a reasonably higher compu-
tational complexity. To further, decrease the computation cost, an algorithm is developed to combine
the rotation and GSVD-based precoding. The new rotation-GSVD-based precoding provides an efficient
approach to find a near-optimal transmit strategy for the MIMOME channel. Extensive numerical results
elaborate on the effectiveness of the rotation-GSVD-based precoding. The new framework developed in
this paper can be applied to a verity of similar problems in the context of multi-antenna channels with
and without secrecy.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, MIMO wiretap channel, secrecy capacity, beamforming, precoding, covari-
ance, rotation.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a complement to higher-layer security measures, physical layer security has emerged as
a significant technique for security in the lowest layer of communication, i.e., the physical
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layer. Founded on information theoretic security, which is built on Shannon’s notion of perfect
secrecy, physical layer security can offer unbreakable security, unlike traditional secret-key-based
methods. Physical layer security was laid in the 1970s in Wyners seminal work on the wiretap
channel [1] where the idea of secure communication based on the communication channel itself
without using encryption keys was first introduced. In this work, Wyner proved that in a wiretap
channel (a channel in which a transmitter conveys information to a legitimate receiver in the
presence of an eavesdropper) communication can be both robust to transmission errors (reliable)
and confidential (secure), to a certain degree, provided that the legitimate user’s channel is better
than the eavesdropper’s channel.1 He established the capacity of the degraded wiretap channel.
Later, Csiszar and Korner [3] generalized this result to arbitrary, not necessarily degraded, wiretap
channels.
In the past few decades, physical layer security has been applied to enhance the classical
wiretap channel, e.g., by including more realistic assumptions, and to study other wireless channel
models. Particularly, as multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) networks continue to flourish
worldwide, significant effort has been applied to the study of MIMO wiretap channels which
allow for exploitation of the space/time/user dimensions of wireless channels for secure com-
munications. Specifically, secrecy capacity of Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output multiple-
eavesdropper (MIMOME) channels under an average total power constraint was established
independently in [4]–[6]. The capacity result is abstracted as an optimization problem over the
input covariance matrix. This problem is non-convex and its optimal solution is known only for
limited settings [7]–[11].
Among notable sub-optimal solutions that can be applied to the MIMOME channel is the
generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD)-based precoding of Khisti and Wornell [4].
GSVD-based precoding decomposes transmitted channel matrices into several parallel subchan-
nels and confidential information is transmitted over subchannels where the legitimate user is
stronger than the eavesdropper. This method gives a closed-form solution for achievable secrecy
rate which is relatively fast and is asymptotically optimal at high signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs).
Its performance is, however, not good at certain settings, e.g., when the eavesdropper has a single
antenna while other nodes have multiple antennas [11]. Another important sub-optimal solution
1Later in the 1990s, Maurer proved that secret key generation through public communication over an insecure yet authenticated
channel is possible even when a legitimate user has a worse channel than an eavesdropper [2].
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is Li et. al’s alternating optimization and water filling (AO-WF) algorithm [12] which alternates
the original optimization problem to a convex problem and finds the corresponding Lagrange
multipliers in an iterative manner. AO-WF is more computationally expensive than GSVD-based
precoding but it can provide a better secrecy rate in some settings. The performance of this
method also varies depending on the number of antennas at different nodes. For example, its
performance is not as good as the GSVD-based precoding when the number of antennas at the
eavesdropper is greater than that of the transmitter. There are also other numerical solutions for
this optimization problem. For example, an iterative algorithm with a barrier method is proposed
in [13]–[15] to find the covariance matrix.
Recently, based on a new parametrization of the covariance matrix, a closed-form solution for
optimal precoding and power allocation of the MIMOME channel with two transmit antennas
was obtained in [11], [16]. This approach in finding the optimal covariance matrix is completely
different from existing linear beamforming methods. It does not require degradedness condition
of [9] and [10], and thus provides the optimal solution for both full-rank and rank-deficient
cases in one shot. The proposed beamforming and power allocation schemes are limited to two
transmit antenna cases, and optimal transmit covariance matrix is still open in general.
In this paper, we extend the approach of [16] to a MIMOME channel with an arbitrary number
of antennas at each node. We establish an optimal precoding and power allocation method named
rotation-based method. In this approach, the precoding matrix is formed by a rotation matrix. We
take the covariance matrix as an operator to stretch and rotate the input symbols to form a transmit
signal that best fits the channels of the legitimate user and eavesdropper. The capacity expression
is then transformed to another problem which can be interpreted as finding the maximum area
and volume in two and three dimensional coordinate systems and a hypervolume in a higher
dimension, depending on the number of transmit antennas. We then solve the new problem and
show that it outperforms the existing methods in various antenna settings.
A. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are listed below:
• We introduce a rotation-based parameterization of the covariance matrix and prove that a
rotation matrix of size nt gives the optimal precoding matrix for the MIMOME channel with
nt antennas at the transmitter. This new parameterization also reveals that linear precoding
achieves the capacity of the MIMOME channel.
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• For nt = 1 and nt = 2, the proposed scheme reduces to those in [8] and [11], respectively,
for which closed-form solutions are known. For nt ≥ 3, finding a closed-form solution
is still challenging. In such a case, we introduce a gradient-based iterative optimization
method to determine optimal rotation angles and power allocation parameters. Numerical
results in different antenna settings confirm that the proposed scheme works better than
the well-known GSVD-based and AO-WF methods. Specifically, the proposed approach
outperforms GSVD-based precoding when ne < nt, and AO-WF approach when ne ≥ nt,
where ne is the number of antennas at the eavesdropper. Particularly, the gap between the
proposed and GSVD-based methods is remarkably high when the eavesdropper has a single
antenna.
• To improve the computational complexity of the proposed algorithm (by reducing the
number of iterations), we develop an algorithm to exploit GSVD-based precoding and
power allocation as an initial point for our rotation-based approach. The combination of the
two approaches, named rotation-GSVD-based approach, improves the results of the both
approaches and implies less computational complexity than the rotation-based approach.
• As a byproduct of this work, we improve the performance of the AO-WF algorithm of
[12] when ne ≥ nt. Under such a circumstance, the first several iterations of AO-WF
algorithm does not give a nonzero solution for the Lagrange multiplier, which deteriorates
its performance. We fix this issue as elaborated in the simulation results.
It is worth mentioning that, the findings of this paper are directly applicable to MIMO
channels without eavesdropper.
B. Other Related Works
An interesting aspect of the developed framework is its generality and its great potential for
extension to other related problems. The MIMOME channel has turned out as a fundamental
tool for the study of physical-layer security in many other related problems throughout the
past decade. The solutions developed for the MIMOME has appeared to be instrumental in
designing transmit strategies that maximize secrecy rate of extensions of this basic channel
model to MIMO channels with multiple eavesdroppers [12], secure relaying [17], [18], ergodic
secrecy rate [19], finite alphabet signaling [20]–[22], multiple access, broadcast, and interference
channels [23]–[26], non-orthogonal multiple access channel [27], cognitive radio [28], visible
light communication [29], and simultaneous wireless information and power transfer [30]–[32]
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Fig. 1: The MIMOME channel with nt, nr, and ne antennas at the transmitter, legitimate receiver,
and eavesdropper.
among others. Therefore, it is worth studying the optimal covariance matrix of the MIMOME
channel as a general tool for physical-layer security in various MIMO settings.
C. Organizations and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model
and related works. Section III introduces and elaborates on the rotation-based precoding by
reformulating the secrecy capacity for the MIMOME channel. Section IV, details a gradient
descent based algorithm to optimize the achievable secrecy rate. In Section V numerous simula-
tion results are carried out to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Section VI
draws the conclusion.
Notations: Bold lowercase letters denote column vectors and bold uppercase letters denote
matrices. A(i, j) denotes the entry (i, j) of matrix A. | · |, (·)T , ln(·), tr(·) denote the absolute
value, Euclidean norm, transpose, natural logarithm, respectively. diag(·) denotes the diagonal
matrix of the set inside.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND RELATED WORKS
A. System Model
We consider a MIMOME channel with nt antennas at the transmitter, nr antennas at the
receiver, and ne antennas at the eavesdropper as depicted in Fig. 1. The received signals at the
5
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can be, respectively, expressed as
yr = Hx + wr, (1a)
ye = Gx + we, (1b)
in which H ∈ Rnr×nt and G ∈ Rne×nt are the channels corresponding to the receiver and
eavesdropper, x ∈ Rnt is transmitted signal, and wr ∈ Rnr and we ∈ Rne are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d) Gaussian noises with zero means and identity covariance matrices.
A representation of secrecy capacity is given by [6]
Cs = max
Q
1
2
{
log
∣∣Inr + HQHT ∣∣− log ∣∣Ine + GQGT ∣∣}
s. t. Q  0,Q = QT , tr(Q) ≤ Pt, (2)
where Q = E{xxT} ∈ Rnt×nt is the covariance matrix of the channel input x and Pt is the
total transmit power. Q is symmetric and positive semi-definite (PSD) by definition.
B. Existing Results
The optimal transmission over the MIMOME channel is still an open problem in general.
However, there are a number of notable analytical results for special numbers of antennas as
well as numerical results as listed below.
1) Analytical Solutions: An analytical capacity-achieving covariance matrix is known only
for special cases. These are limited to:
• nt = 1: this is the single-input multiple-output (SIMO) case in which Q is a scalar and the
optimal solution is either Pt or 0 [8].
• nr = 1: the so-called multiple-input single-output multiple-eavesdropper (MISOME) chan-
nel in which generalized eigenvalue decomposition of H and G achieves the capacity [33].
• nt = 2, nr = 2, and ne = 1: the optimization problem is shown to be the Rayleigh quotient
and optimal signaling, which is the maximum eigenvalue of this problem, is unit-rank [7].
• nt = 2: in which the secrecy capacity is obtained by modeling the covariance matrix as a
2× 2 rotation matrix [11], [16].
• Q is full-rank (which implies HTH − GTG  0) and also Pt is greater than a certain
threshold [9], [10]: in this case the problem is convex and KarushKuhnTucker (KKT)
conditions are used to find the optimal Q.
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It is worth noting that, as nt grows, few channel realizations satisfy the above conditions.
For nt = 3, nr = 3, and ne = 1, for example, the probability that a full-rank solution exist
is less than 18.2%.2 This value decreases when ne goes up. Therefore, it can be said that
an analytical solution for the MIMOME channel is still an open problem in many practical
cases.
2) Suboptimal Analytical Solution: For a general MIMOME channel, a sub-optimal solution
can be obtained using GSVD-based beamforming [4]. By applying GSVD on H and G, the
optimization problem (2) is simplified to a set of parallel non-interfering channels whose optimal
power allocation can be obtained using Lagrange multiplier and KKT conditions [34]. Since
parallelization using GSVD does not necessarily convert this problem into an equivalent one,
GSVD-based beamforming is not the optimal solution in general. It is not even close enough to
the capacity in some cases.
3) Numerical Solutions: There are still important cases of the MIMOME for which optimal
Q is unknown. Due to the intractability of the problem in an analytical form, numerical solutions
have been developed to tackle this problem. The alternating optimization water-filling (AO-WF)
[12], which is computationally efficient to implement, is one of them. Despite its effectiveness
in many cases, AO-WF experiences problems when ne is greater than nt, for example, which
is caused by a failure in finding an optimal Lagrange multiplier. We modify this issue in this
paper as we will see later in Section V. The price is a higher time consumption, in the modified
approach.
In the next section, we introduce a new model for the covariance matrix Q which is a
generalization of the solution in [11], [12], from nt = 2 to any arbitrary nt. This model is then
used to find transmit signaling that can be used to achieve secrecy capacity of the MIMOME
channel regardless of the number of antennas at different nodes.
III. A ROTATION-BASED MODELING OF THE PROBLEM
The secrecy capacity of the MIMOME channel in (2) can be rewritten as [11]
Cs = max
Q0,tr(Q)≤Pt
1
2
log
|Int + HTHQ|
|Ine + GTGQ|
. (3)
2This is obtained by Monte Carol experiments with 106 trails where H and G have the same distributions.
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Fig. 2: The structure of the proposed linear precoding and power allocation.
Also, the covariance matrix Q can be eigendecomposed as
Q = VΛVT , (4)
in which Λ is a diagonal matrix and its diagonal elements are the eigenvalues of Q, which are
real and non-negative, i.e.,
Λ = diag(λi), λi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , nt, (5)
and V ∈ Rnt×nt is the matrix composed of nt corresponding eigenvectors of Q in Rnt vector
space. With this, the total power constraint tr(Q) ≤ Pt will be equivalent to
nt∑
i=1
λi ≤ Pt. (6)
An immediate implication of the above decomposition is that linear precoding can achieve the
capacity of the MIMOME channel. The architecture of the above linear precoding and power
allocation is depicted in Fig. 2. In this figure, s1, . . . , snt are input symbols which are independent
and identically distributed Gaussian random variables with zero means and unit variances, λis are
power allocation coefficients, V is the precoding matrix, and x = [x1, . . . , xnt ]T is the transmit
vector whose covariance is Q. Since Q is symmetric, the matrix V is orthonormal. Then it can
be considered as a rotation operation applied to the vector multiplied with (see, Fig. 2). Because
of this, we use a series of basic rotation matrices to represent the orthonormal matrix V. Each
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basic rotation matrix represents the rotation between two axes in Rnt vector space while other
axes are fixed. In the following subsections, we first review the rotation-based method for nt = 2
and then generalize it to nt = 3 and arbitrary nt.
A. Rotation-based Method for nt = 2 [16]
The capacity region of MIMOME channel with two transmit antennas has been established
in [11], [16], using a rotation matrix in two-dimensional (2D) space. In this case, eigenvalue
matrix Λ can be written as
Λ =
λ1 0
0 λ2
 , (7)
and, without loss of generality, the eigenvectors can be written as the following orthonormal
(rotation) matrix
V = V12 =
cos θ12 − sin θ12
sin θ12 cos θ12
 . (8)
The parameter θ12 in rotation matrix V12 is the rotation angle corresponding to the rotation from
the direction of the standard basis (unit vector) e1 = (1, 0)T to the standard basis e2 = (0, 1)T in
R2 vector space. This rotation is achieved on the plane defined by e1 and e2. Then, the covariance
matrix Q can be built using three parameters: the two non-negative eigenvalues λ1 and λ2, and
the rotation angle θ12. With these parameters, we can represent any arbitrary 2 × 2 covariance
matrix as in (4). Then the original optimization problem can be equivalently converted to
Cs = max
λ1,λ2,θ12
1
2
log
|Int + HTHVΛVT |
|Int + GTGVΛVT |
, (9a)
s. t. λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ1 + λ2 ≤ Pt. (9b)
In the light of this modeling, an analytical solution for optimal precoding matrix and power
allocation scheme according to Λ are obtained in [16] by finding θ12, λ1 and λ2. In the next
subsection, we extend this method to the cases with nt = 3.
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B. Rotation-based Method for nt = 3
Similar to the previous case, we use the eigenvalue decomposition of (4). For nt = 3, the
eigenvalue matrix Λ can be written as
Λ =

λ1 0 0
0 λ2 0
0 0 λ3
 , (10)
in which λi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3. Similarly, the orthonormal matrix V can be written as a rotation
matrix, which is obtained by a product of three basic rotation matrices,
V = V12V13V23, (11)
in which
V12 =

cos θ12 − sin θ12 0
sin θ12 cos θ12 0
0 0 1
 , (12a)
V13 =

cos θ13 0 − sin θ13
0 1 0
sin θ13 0 cos θ13
 , (12b)
and
V23 =

1 0 0
0 cos θ23 − sin θ23
0 sin θ23 cos θ23
 . (12c)
Lemma 1. To reach secrecy capacity of the MIMOME channel with nt = 3 it is sufficient to use
a diagonal Λ and the rotation matrix V given in (11) to generate the input covariance matrix
Q = VΛVT .
Proof. To prove Lemma 1, we first prove VΛVT is a covariance matrix. Since V12, V13, and
V23 are orthonormal matrices, then
VVT = V12V13V23V
T
23V
T
13V
T
12 = I, (13)
which means V is orthonormal. Therefore, if λi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is satisfied, then Q is
symmetric and PSD, i.e., it is a covariance matrix.
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We next prove that any 3×3 covariance matrix can be written as (4) in which V is a rotation
matrix. To this end, it is sufficient to show that any orthonormal matrix V can be decomposed
as in (11). That is, for any orthonormal matrix V we can find a set of θ12, θ13, and θ23. The
rotation angles are obtained in [35]. We state the result here.
• If V(3, 1) 6= ±1,
θ13 = asin
(
V(3, 1)
)
or θ13 = pi − asin
(
V(3, 1)
)
, (14a)
θ12 = atan2
(
V(2, 1)
cos(θ13)
,
V(1, 1)
cos(θ13)
)
, (14b)
and
θ23 = atan2
(
V(3, 2)
cos(θ13)
,
V(3, 3)
cos(θ13)
)
, (14c)
in which atan2(·, ·) is the four-quadrant inverse tangent which is defined as
atan2(x, y) =

arctan( y
x
), if x > 0,
arctan( y
x
) + pi, if x < 0 and y ≥ 0,
arctan( y
x
)− pi, if x < 0 and y < 0,
pi
2
, if x = 0 and y > 0,
−pi
2
, if x = 0 and y < 0,
undefined, if x = 0 and y = 0.
(15)
• If V(3, 1) = 1, then θ12 is an arbitrary number (θ12 ∈ R) and
θ13 = pi/2, (16a)
θ23 = θ12 + atan2
(
V(1, 2),V(1, 3)
)
. (16b)
• If V(3, 1) = −1, then θ12 is an arbitrary number (θ12 ∈ R) and
θ13 = −pi/2, (17a)
θ23 = −θ12 + atan2
(−V(1, 2),−V(1, 3)). (17b)
Therefore, an arbitrary 3×3 covariance matrix can be represented as Q = VΛVT where Λ and
V are defined in (10) and (11).3 In some scenarios, the eigenvalue decomposition can give us
3From the above solution, it is obvious that the solution is not unique.
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an improper rotation matrix [36], i.e., an orthonormal matrix whose determinate is −1. In order
to use (11) to find the rotation angles, two eigenvectors of V and the corresponding eigenvalues
of Λ should be exchanged to ensure det(V) = 1. In such a case, for example, we can define
V′ = VI′ and Λ′ = I′TΛI′, where
I′ =

1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
 . (18)
I′ exchanges the second and third columns of V and Λ. But Q still can be represented by V′
and Λ′, since I′I′T = I and
V′Λ′V′T = (VI′)
(
I′TΛI′
)
(VI′)T = VΛVT . (19)
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Similar to the case with nt = 2, θij denotes a rotation from the direction of the ith to the jth
standard basis vectors in R3 vector space, where i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i < j.
Then, the equivalent optimization problem for nt = 3 is
Cs = max
Λ,θ12,θ13,θ23
1
2
log
|Int + HTHVΛVT |
|Int + GTGVΛVT |
, (20a)
s. t. λi ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2, 3};
3∑
i=1
λi ≤ Pt. (20b)
C. Generalization to an Arbitrary nt
To generalize the rotation-based method to an arbitrary nt × nt covariance matrix, we prove
that Λ ∈ Rnt×nt is a diagonal matrix with non-negative elements Λ(i, i) = λi, and V is a
rotation matrix in Rnt×nt vector space which can be obtained by
V =
nt−1∏
i=1
nt∏
j=i+1
Vij, (21)
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in which the basic rotation matrix Vij is the Givens matrix [37] defined as
Vij =

1 · · · · · · 0
... . . .
...
vii · · · vij ...
... . . .
...
...
vji · · · vjj ...
... . . .
...
0 · · · · · · · · · 1

, (22)
and vii vij
vji vjj
 =
cos θij − sin θij
sin θij cos θij
 . (23)
Vij represents a rotation from the ith standard basis to the jth standard basis in Rnt vector
space with a rotation angle θij . That is, we show that an arbitrary orthogonal matrix V can be
represented by (21). Further, an arbitrary covariance matrix Q ∈ Rnt×nt can be represented by
nt non-negative eigenvalues and 12nt(nt − 1) rotation angles.
It should be noted that the order of multiplication in (21) is not unique and different order
will lead to different rotation angles θij . In this paper, without loss of generality, we use the
order definition in (21).
Theorem 1. To reach the secrecy capacity of the MIMOME with nt ≥ 2 it suffices to use the
rotation matrix V of (21) as a precoding matrix.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. First, it is straightforward
to check that V in (21) is an orthonormal matrix, as we did in (13). Next, we prove that an
arbitrary orthonormal matrix V can be written as (21). Equivalently, we may show that(
nt−1∏
i=1
nt∏
j=i+1
Vij
)T
V = I. (24)
To this end, for a given orthonormal V, it suffices to to find θij such that (24) holds. This process
is carried out in Algorithm 1. In fact, if we expand the product of matrices on the left side of V
in (24), we see that V is initially multiplied with VT12. Then, the corresponding rotation angle
θ12 can be chosen to set the entry (2, 1) of V to zero. Next, VT13 is multiplied to the new V and
θ13 can be chosen to set the entry (3, 1) to zero. This process continues until the last element
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Algorithm 1 Rotation Angles Solution
1: Initialize [V,Λ] = eig(Q), i = 1;
2: if det(V) = -1 then
3: Exchange first two columns of V;
4: Exchange first two values on diagonal of Λ;
5: end if
6: while i ≤ (nt − 1) do
7: j = i+ 1;
8: while j ≤ nt do
9: θij = −atan2(−V(j, i),V(i, i));
10: Vrot = Int ;
11: Vrot(i, i) = Vrot(j, j) = cos θij;
12: Vrot(j, i) = −Vrot(i, j) = sin θij;
13: V = VrotV;
14: j = j + 1;
15: end while
16: i = i+ 1;
17: end while
18: Output θij , ∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ nt.
under the main diagonal of V, i.e., the entry (nt, nt − 1), becomes zero. We note that, since V
is orthonormal, the upper triangle also will be zero throughout this process. That is, the left side
of (24) becomes a unity matrix. This proves Theorem 1. The rotation angles θij can be obtained
by Algorithm 1 which is a generalization of Algorithm 5.1.3 of [37] for vectors in Rnt .
Theorem 2. For ant nt, the optimization problem (3) can be equivalently reformulated as
Cs = max
Λ,θij
1
2
log
|Int + HTHVΛVT |
|Int + GTGVΛVT |
, (25a)
s. t. λi ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , nt};
nt∑
i=1
λi ≤ Pt. (25b)
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This new representation replaces the constraint Q  0 by a set of scalar constraints on
eigenvalues. Then, numerical methods such as gradient descent can be applied to optimize the
parameters θij and λi to maximize (25a) to obtain the optimal secrecy rate.
IV. SOLVING THE NEW OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The rotation-based construction of Q ensures Q is symmetric and PSD. For Q with dimension
nt, the required number of parameters is 12nt(nt + 1), which is equal to the free variables in Q.
The rotation-based method can provide a systematic structure to traverse Q by traversing a group
of parameters which are in finite ranges. The possible range of each θij in (22) is [0, 2pi).4 The
range of each λi is [0, Pt] with the constraint that sum of all λis should not exceed the average
power Pt. The rotation-based method simplifies the matrix constraints of (2) to scalar constraints
in (25b). The eigenvalues in the rotation-based method are power allocation coefficients whereas
the rotation matrix acts as the precoding matrix.
The problem is not convex if no constraint is applied to H and G [10]. However, applying
the rotation-based method, the values of local optimums are very close to the global one. The
reason is that, a certain covariance matrix Q can correspond to different groups of rotation angles
and eigenvalues. For example, Q will not be changed if we swap ith and jth eigenvalues in Λ
and ith and jth eigenvectors in V, whereas, the rotation angles and the order of eigenvalues
will change. Moreover, multiple solutions may be caused by the periodicity of angles and no
sequencing limitation on eigenvalues. Therefore, some symmetries exist when Q is written as a
function of θijs and λis.
For nt = 2, a closed-form solution has been obtained in [11]. In this paper, we consider the
case with nt ≥ 3. Since finding analytical solution of λi and θij is challenging, we resort to
numerical methods to optimize (25a) and (25b). More specifically, gradient descent is applied to
find the solution. The gradient descent can be applied to determine the eigenvalues and rotation
angles. The gradient descent we use contains two steps: first, we apply gradient descent on
eigenvalues for given rotation angles; then, we fix the eigenvalues and apply gradient descent
on rotation angles. We then iterate this process. The details are discussed in the following.
4It can be proved that in some cases the optimal θij is in [0, pi). See, for example, the case for nt = 2 [11].
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A. Gradient Descent-based Solution
We derive the gradient of (25a) with respect to θij and λi in this subsection. By multiplying
the nominator and denominator of the argument of the logarithm by VT and V, the objective
function (25a) can be represented as
R(λ,θ) , 1
2
log
|Int + VTHTHVΛ|
|Int + VTGTGVΛ|
, (26)
in which the λ is the diagonal of Λ and θ contains all rotation angles required in V.
We first derive the gradient with respect to θij . For simplicity of presentation, we define
A , VTHTHVΛ, (27a)
B , VTGTGVΛ. (27b)
We use the Jacobi’s formula [38] to calculate the gradient of the determinant of matrix M
d
dt
|M| = |M|tr
(
M−1
dM
dt
)
. (28)
Then,
d
dt
log |M| = 1
ln 2
tr
(
M−1
dM
dt
)
. (29)
The derivative with respect to the rotation angle θij is
∂R
∂θij
=
∂
∂θij
1
2
log
|I + A|
|I + B|
=
∂
∂θij
1
2
log |I + A| − d
dθij
1
2
log |I + B|
=η · tr
[
(I + A)−1
∂(I + A)
∂θij
]
− η · tr
[
(I + B)−1
∂(I + B)
∂θij
]
=η · tr
[
(I + A)−1
∂A
∂θij
]
− η · tr
[
(I + B)−1
∂B
∂θij
]
, (30)
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where η = 1/(2 ln 2) and the third equality is due to (29). Next, we get the derivative of A with
respect to θij , which is given as
∂A
∂θij
=
∂(VTHTHVΛ)
∂θij
=
∂
∂θij
(n−1∏
m=1
n∏
k=m+1
Vmk
)T
HTH
(
n−1∏
m=1
n∏
k=m+1
Vmk
)
Λ

=
[
Vα
(
j−1∏
k=i+1
Vik
)
∂Vij
∂θij
(
n∏
k=j+1
Vik
)
Vβ
]T
HTHVΛ
+ VTHTHVα
(
j−1∏
k=i+1
Vik
)
∂Vij
∂θij
(
n∏
k=j+1
Vik
)
VβΛ, (31)
where
Vα =
i−1∏
m=1
n∏
k=m+1
Vmk, (32a)
Vβ =
n−1∏
m=i+1
n∏
k=m+1
Vmk. (32b)
As an example, for nt = 3 and θij = θ23 the derivative of A is
∂A
∂θ23
=
∂(VT23V
T
13V
T
12H
THV12V13V23Λ)
∂θ23
=
dVT23
dθ23
VT13V
T
12H
THV12V13V23Λ + V
T
23V
T
13V
T
12H
THV12V13
dV23
dθ23
Λ. (33)
Second, we derive the partial derivative with respect to the eigenvalues. The derivative of (26)
with respect to λi is
∂R
∂λi
=
∂
∂λi
1
2
log
|I + A|
|I + B|
= ρ · tr
[
(I + A)−1
∂Λ
∂λi
]
− ρ · tr
[
(I + B)−1
∂Λ
∂λi
]
= ρ · tr
[
(I + A)−1VTHTHV
∂Λ
∂λi
]
− ρ · tr
[
(I + B)−1VTGTGV
∂Λ
∂λi
]
, (34)
in which
∂Λ
∂λi
=
 1, entry(i, i),
0, elsewhere.
(35)
To satisfy the constraints in (25b), we need to make sure all eigenvalues are positive and their
sume is not greater than Pt. To satisfy the former we define λ+ = max{0,λ} make the negative
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elements of λ zero. For the latter, we add a penalty function on eigenvalues after each step of
its gradient descent. Specifically, we let
λ = Pt
λ+∑nt
i=1 λ
+
i
. (36)
So far we have the gradient of (26) with respect to eigenvalues and rotation angles as follow
∇θR =
[
∂R
∂θ12
, . . . ,
∂R
∂θij
, . . . ,
∂R
∂θ(nt−1)nt
]
, (37a)
∇λR =
[
∂R
∂λ1
, . . . ,
∂R
∂λnt
]
. (37b)
B. Initialization of the Gradient Descent
The gradient (26) with respect to both rotation angles and eigenvalues have many repetitive
factors that can reduce computation time. Besides, efficient initial values can further reduce the
iteration time. A feasible way is to initialize the algorithm is to use GSVD-based beamforming
[34] for Q. The solution given by GSVD-based beamforming provides a precoding matrix E
which satisfy
HE = ΨrC, (38a)
GE = ΨeD, (38b)
CTC + DTD = I, (38c)
where E ∈ Rnt×q, q = min(nt, nr + ne), CTC = diag(ci) and DTD = diag(di), i ∈ {1, . . . , q},
are diagonal matrices, and Ψr ∈ Rnr×nr and Ψe ∈ Rne×ne are orthonormal matrices. Besides,
the power allocation matrix P = diag(pi) is determined by [34]
pi =

max(0, 2(ci−di)/(µai)−2
1+
√
1−4cidi+4(ci−di)cidi/(µai)
), if ci > di,
0, otherwise,
(39)
in which pi and ai are the ith diagonal element of P and ETE, and µ is the Lagrange multiplier
to ensure
tr(EPET ) = Pt. (40)
So, the GSVD-based initialization of Q is EPET . Thus, we can determine V(0) and Λ(0) from
Q(0) = EPET = V(0)Λ(0)V(0)T . (41)
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Next, the eigenvalues and rotation angles of Λ(0) and V(0) can be obtained using Algorithm 1.
The gradient-descent rotation-based method is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Rotation-based Method by Gradient Descent
1: Initialize: counter for eigenvalue iterations n = 0;
2: Initialize: step coefficient for eigenvalues ρλ = 0.02;
3: Initialize:  = 10−4;
4: Find: V(0) and Λ(0) using GSVD in (41);
5: Find: θ(0) = [θ(0)12 , θ
(0)
13 , θ
(0)
23 ] using Algorithm 1;
6: Find: λ(0) = [λ(0)1 , λ
(0)
2 , λ
(0)
3 ] is the diagonal of Λ
(0);
7: while 1 do
8: Initialize: counter for rotation angles iterations k = 0;
9: Initialize: step coefficient for rotation angles ρθ = 0.05;
10: while 1 do
11: Update counter: k = k + 1;
12: Calculate: ∇θR using (37a);
13: Update rotation angles: θ(k) = θ(k−1) + ρθ∇θR;
14: Calculate R using (26) and let R(k)θ = R;
15: if 0 ≤ R(k)θ −R(k−1)θ < |R(k−1)θ | then
16: Rmaxθ = max(0, R
(k)
θ ); break;
17: end if
18: if R(k)θ > R
(k−1)
θ then
19: ρθ = 1.1ρθ;
20: else
21: ρθ = 0.7ρθ;
22: end if
23: end while
24: Update counter: n = n+ 1;
25: Calculate: ∇λR using (37b);
26: Update eigenvalues: λ(n) = λ(n−1) + ρλ∇λR;
27: Normalize eigenvalue λ(n) using (36);
28: Calculate R using (26) and let R(n)λ = R;
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29: if 0 ≤ R(n)λ −R(n−1)λ < |R(n−1)| then
30: Rmax = max(0, R
(n)
λ ); break;
31: end if
32: if R(k)θ > R
(k−1)
θ then
33: ρλ = 0.9ρλ;
34: else
35: ρλ = 1.3ρλ;
36: end if
37: end while
38: Output: Rmax, λ(n), and θ(k).
V. NUMERICAL RESULT
In this section, extensive numerical results are provided to illustrate the performance of the
proposed method. Our results are compared with GSVD-based beamforming with optimal power
allocation [34] and also the alternating optimization and water-filling (AO-WF) proposed in
[12]. Two kinds of initializations are applied to the proposed rotation-based method. In the first
approach, eigenvalues and rotation angles are initialized randomly (labeled by Rotation) whereas
in the second approach they are initialized based on the output of GSVD-based beamforming
(labeled by Rotation-GSVD). All plots are based on averaging on 100 realizations of independent
H and G. The entries of H and G are generated based on the standard Gaussian distribution,
i.e., N (0, 1).
This section is divided into two subsections. In the first subsection, the case where the
eavesdropper has a fewer number of antennas is discussed. Under such condition, AO-WF and
the proposed method have better performance than GSVD-based beamforming. In the second
subsection, the problem in AO-WF is analyzed when eavesdropper has a large number of
antennas. In the end, a statistical analysis of the distribution of eigenvalues in the rotation-based
method is provided.
A. MIMOME with ne < nt
In this subsection, we let nt = 3 and ne = 1, and change nr. The cases that the receiver has
different antennas are shown in Fig. 3.
GSVD-based beamforming is relatively fast precoding and power allocation approach for the
MIMOME channel. The precoding and the power allocation matrices can be obtained analytically,
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Fig. 3: Secrecy rate of the MIMOME channel versus the transmit power for nt = 3, ne = 1,
and different value of nr. The proposed methods are compared with GSVD-based beamforming
and AO-WF.
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as explained in Section IV-B. However, when the eavesdropper has a smaller number of antennas
than the legitimate receiver, GSVD-based beamforming fails to get close to the secrecy capacity,
as can be seen in Fig. 3, and also is verified by previous literature [11]. The gap can be very
large as seen in Fig. 3. Nonetheless, GSVD-based beamforming can produce effective initial
values for the parameters in our proposed rotation-based method.5
The rotation-based method and AO-WF give similar results initialized by GSVD-based beam-
forming, and the time cost is also close. If the initial values are given randomly, the rotation-based
method has about three times of higher cost compared to AO-WF, in this experiment. Meanwhile,
the achievable secrecy rate is slightly lower, which means GSVD-based beamforming can give
an efficient initial values for our rotation-based method.
B. MIMOME with ne ≥ nr and Modified AO-WF
When the number of antennas at the eavesdropper is higher than or equal to the number of
antennas at the receiver, AO-WF cannot use the full average power, which means tr(Q) < Pt
happens. Fig. 4 illustrates the ratio of the power that actually used in the solution of AO-WF,
i.e., tr(Q)/Pt. The result is based on 100 realizations of H and G when the nt = 3, nr = 4,
and ne = 5.
This limitation comes from the Lagrange multiplier of AO-WF. The inner loop of AO-WF
uses a binary search to find the Lagrange multiplier such that tr(Q) reaches the average power
Pt. However, when ne ≥ nt the first several outer-iterations cannot give a nonzero solution for
the Lagrange multiplier.
To illustrate this, we apply AO-WF on following H and G
H =

1.4628 −1.9093 0.2941
−0.8861 0.9319 0.6151
−1.9243 0.7442 0.3094
−0.4729 −1.2250 −0.1745
 , (42)
5We need to mention that the covariance matrix given by AO-WF may use higher power than the total average power, i.e.
tr(Q) > Pt. To overcome this shortcoming, we add a termination condition, i.e., tr(Q)−Pt ≤ 10−6, to ensure the constraints
in (2) are fulfilled.
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Fig. 4: The rate of power used in AO-WF.
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G =

−2.0156 −0.8023 0.1474
−2.1129 −0.3437 0.1646
−1.5204 −1.1948 −0.2154
−0.7177 1.7458 −0.4084
0.3622 1.3965 −2.1588

. (43)
Fig. 5(a) shows the status of binary search for Lagrange multiplier when the termination condition
of AO-WF have been met (the outer loop terminates at iteration 87). The binary search gives a
Lagrange multiplier λ close to zero (≈ 10−5), as can be seen in Fig. 5(a). That is, the binary
search loses its efficacy because during the search the trace of the covariance matrix Q (the
23
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Fig. 6: Comparison between original and modified AO-WF for nt = 3, ne = 5, and different
nrs.
curve with respect to AO-WF in Fig. 5(a)) has no intersection with the aimed average power Pt
(the dashed line Fig. 5(a)).
A feasible solution to this problem is to increase the number of iterations for the outer loop.
To this end, we modify the AO-WF algorithm by using a stricter stop condition for the outer
loop. Specifically, we change the termination condition from∣∣R(Q(n))−R(Q(n−1))∣∣ /R(Q(n−1)) ≤ , (44)
to ∣∣∣∣∣R(Q(n))−
n−1∑
k=n−21
R(Q(k))
∣∣∣∣∣ /
n−1∑
k=n−21
R(Q(k)) ≤ . (45)
In this new termination condition, R(Q(n)) is compared with the average of previous 20 iterations.
The curve with respect to modified AO-WF in Fig. 5(a) shows that a non-zero Lagrange multiplier
is successfully found with this modification. Accordingly, the secrecy rate slightly goes up in
Fig. 5(b). However, it should be noted that, as a result of this change the number of iterations of
the outer loop increases form 87 to 225. That is, the modification comes at the cost of a higher
computational complexity.
The aforementioned issue for the AO-WF algorithm appears when ne ≥ nt. The proposed
modified AO-WF overcomes this issues performs better than the original one when ne ≥ nt as
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shown in Fig. 6. Modified AO-WF is also more stable and can provide a higher secrecy rate. For
ne ≥ nt, we benchmark our rotation-based algorithms with the modifies AO-WF. Even with this,
our precoding outperforms that algorithm. Obviously, when compared with the original AO-WF
the performance gap will be higher.
A comparison of GSVD-based beamforming, modified AO-WF, and the proposed rotation-
based algorithms are illustrated in Fig. 7, where the eavesdropper has a higher number of antennas
than the receiver. The rotation-based method initialed by GSVD-based beamforming shows the
best performance in all three situations.
To summarize, in this section, we have examined the proposed rotation method with GSVD-
based beamforming and AO-WF in the MIMOME channel for various number of antennas at
each node. It turns out that when ne < nt both AO-WF and the proposed method achieve better
secrecy rate than GSVD-based beamforming. When the eavesdropper has a higher number of
antennas than the transmitter, the AO-WF faces a problem. To overcome this issue, a modification
is applied to AO-WF in this section. The modified AO-WF has a better stability compared to
the original one and improves the rate. Even when compared with the modified AO-WF, our
proposed methods still show better performance compared to GSVD-based beamforming and
modified AO-WF.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have developed a rotation-based method for precoding and power allocation
of the MIMOME channel. In this method, the transmit covariance matrix is constructed using a
rotation matrix, which is used as a precoder, and a power allocation matrix. With this construction,
the positive semi-definite constraint of the transmit covariance matrix is removed and the capacity
region optimization problem is simplified. The optimal precoding (rotation) matrix and power
allocation coefficients have been obtained through the gradient descent method. Compared to
existing numerical approaches, the proposed method is robust and performs well independent of
the number of antennas at each node. The proposed method remarkably outperforms the GSVD-
based beamforming when ne = 1, and is slightly better than AO-WF, even we modified. This
approach can also use the results of existing precoding and power allocation methods, such as
GSVD-based approach, as an initial point to expedite finding the optimal solution.
The proposed rotation-based method is efficient in the MIMOME channel. More importantly, it
has a great potential for optimizing precoding and power allocation in various other applications
25
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including in MIMO broadcast channel, with and without secrecy. Future works will focus on
simplification of solving parameters in the rotation model and extension of this approach to other
related problems.
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